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Abstract

The conventional approach of choosing sample size to provide 80% or greater
power ignores the cost implications of different sample size choices. Costs, however, are often impossible for investigators and funders to ignore in actual practice.
Here, we propose and justify a new approach for choosing sample size based on
cost efficiency, the ratio of a study’s projected scientific and/or practical value
to its total cost. By showing that a study’s projected value exhibits diminishing
marginal returns as a function of increasing sample size for a wide variety of definitions of study value, we are able to develop two simple choices that can be
defended as more cost efficient than any larger sample size. The first is to choose
the sample size that minimizes the average cost per subject. The second is to
choose sample size to minimize total cost divided by the square root of sample
size. This latter method is theoretically more justifiable for innovative studies, but
also performs reasonably well and has some justification in other cases. For example, if projected study value is assumed to be proportional to power at a specific
alternative and total cost is a linear function of sample size, then this approach is
guaranteed either to produce more than 90% power or to be more cost efficient
than any sample size that does. These methods are easy to implement, based on
reliable inputs, and well justified, so they should be regarded as acceptable alternatives to current conventional approaches.
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Summary
The conventional approach of choosing sample size to provide 80% or greater power ignores the
cost implications of different sample size choices. Costs, however, are often impossible for
investigators and funders to ignore in actual practice. Here, we propose and justify a new
approach for choosing sample size based on cost efficiency, the ratio of a study’s projected
scientific and/or practical value to its total cost. By showing that a study’s projected value
exhibits diminishing marginal returns as a function of increasing sample size for a wide variety
of definitions of study value, we are able to develop two simple choices that can be defended as
more cost efficient than any larger sample size. The first is to choose the sample size that
minimizes the average cost per subject. The second is to choose sample size to minimize total
cost divided by the square root of sample size. This latter method is theoretically more
justifiable for innovative studies, but also performs reasonably well and has some justification in
other cases. For example, if projected study value is assumed to be proportional to power at a
specific alternative and total cost is a linear function of sample size, then this approach is
guaranteed either to produce more than 90% power or to be more cost efficient than any sample
size that does. These methods are easy to implement, based on reliable inputs, and well justified,
so they should be regarded as acceptable alternatives to current conventional approaches.
Key words: Innovation; Peer review; Power; Research funding; Study design.

1. Introduction
The conventional approach to choosing a sample size is to specify a goal and then calculate the
sample size needed to reach that goal, with no explicit consideration of the cost implications.
For health-related research involving human subjects, reviewers expect the goal to be 80% or
90% power, and some even regard use of this approach and this goal as necessary for a study to
be ethical (Halpern, Karlawish, and Berlin., 2002; Horrobin, 2002). Despite these rigid
expectations, we see no justification for ignoring costs. When studies compete for limited
resources, with many studies going unfunded despite being judged to be excellent in a rigorous
peer review process, cost efficiency seems important. We propose here new methods for
choosing sample size that utilize cost information, and we explain why they should be
considered acceptable approaches.
A number of fully Bayesian methods proposed for selecting sample size, usually known
as maximization of expected utility (MEU) or value of information (VOI) methods, do take costs
into account (Detsky, 1990; Claxton and Posnett, 1996; Bernardo, 1997; Lindley, 1997; Tan and
Smith, 1998; Gittins and Pezeshk, 2000a,b; Halpern, Brown, and Hornberger, 2001; Walker,
2003; Willan and Pinto, 2005). These attempt to maximize the study’s projected value minus its
cost, which requires quantifying value and cost on the same scale, along with specifying priors
that quantify uncertainty about the state of nature. Unfortunately, these more thoughtful methods
have not been widely used (Yokota and Thompson, 2004). We propose here new and simple-toimplement approaches to sample size planning using costs. In contrast to the MEU/VOI
approaches to date, these are based on cost efficiency, meaning the ratio of the study’s projected
scientific and/or practical value to its total costs—where MEU/VOI seeks to maximize a quantity
analogous to “gross profit,” we focus on “return on investment.” Our proposed choices are more
cost efficient than any larger sample size, which provides investigators using them with a ready
defense against the common charge of “inadequate” sample size. If a reviewer or funder
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believes that a larger study would be worth doing, then a study that produces more value per unit
cost must also be worthwhile. This high degree of defensibility is a crucial property that
investigators need before they dare to depart from the current rigid conventions.
This article is organized as follows. We first provide a motivating example in Section 2, and
then develop our methods in Section 3, along with some of their properties and conditions that
justify them. In Section 4, we examine different measures of study value. We provide further
examples in Section 5 and conclude with discussion in Section 6.
2. Motivating example: review of proposals.
Because of the rigid expectations noted above, essentially every proposal seeking funding for
clinical research includes a claim that its sample size will provide at least 80% power. Indeed,
some have complained of a “sample size game” (Goodman and Berlin, 1994), in which
investigators choose a sample size based on feasibility and cost considerations and then “invert
the equation” (Detsky, 1990) to subsequently find assumptions that produce a calculation
showing 80% power. Many reviewers guard against this practice by scrutinizing and criticizing
the sample size justifications in grant proposals. We illustrate this dynamic with a simple
example.
An investigator proposes to test a safe and inexpensive new treatment for a condition that
resolves spontaneously in 40% of patients. As there is no existing treatment, she plans a
randomized, double-blind, placebo-controlled trial. The proposal argues that if the biological
theory underlying the new treatment is correct, then it should produce a cure in at least 1/3 of the
patients who would not have had spontaneous resolution, an additional 20% or a difference of
40% versus 60%. A standard formula (Hulley, et al., 2001) shows that the proposed sample size
of 97 per arm produces 80% power. Reviewer 1 finds this acceptable. Reviewer 2 feels that a
rate of 60% is fairly likely if the biological theory is correct, but lower rates might be possible.
He proposes that it would be safer to power the study for a difference of 40% versus 54%,
requiring about a doubling of the proposed sample size. Reviewer 3 believes that the likely rate
is irrelevant, because the study must be powered based on the minimum clinically significant
difference, which all reviewers agree is about 10%. To obtain 80% power for this difference of
40% versus 50% would require about a quadrupling of the proposed sample size. Reviewer 3
further notes that anything less than 80% power for the minimum clinically significant difference
would be unethical, citing a paper in a leading medical journal (Halpern, et al. 2002). This
situation highlights a common difficulty in performing power calculations: what difference or
effect size should be assumed? This assumption is very influential, because changes in the
assumed difference are magnified in the resulting sample size, as noted above. But precisely
specifying the difference is difficult. Even the conceptual basis for picking the difference is
unclear: should it be a difference considered to be likely to exist, or the smallest difference that
would be clinically important?
We now consider a line of reasoning that could justify the investigator’s proposed sample
size while avoiding these difficulties. Despite the reviewers’ concerns, an analysis of cost
efficiency can show that if they agree that a larger study would be worth conducting, then so is
the study as proposed. Suppose that the study as proposed costs $200,000, but substantially
larger sample sizes would cost more per patient due to the need to have multiple clinical sites
with increased set-up, overhead, and coordination costs that are not completely offset by
economies of scale: doubling the sample size would cost $500,000, and quadrupling the sample
size would cost $1 million. In order to concretely illustrate the cost efficiencies involved, we
need to compare these costs to a particular measure of the projected value that the study can be
expected to produce. For illustrative purposes, we define a measure based on the predominant
frequentist paradigm in which a 2-sided p-value <0.05 in favor of the new treatment will lead to
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“rejection” of the null hypothesis that it is not effective and therefore to its adoption in practice.
Based on how long it may be until other, better treatments are developed, suppose that an
expected 100,000 future patients will be treated according to the result of the study. Also assume
a 0.25 probability that the treatment is effective at the assumed alternative rates. (We can also
assume a 0.25 probability that the treatment might prevent an equal proportion of spontaneous
cures. This creates pre-study equipoise, but does not materially impact our calculations, because
the chance of wrongly adopting the treatment when it is really harmful is very small for the
sample sizes considered here.) The expected number of future cures is then calculated as
100,000 times the proportion of patients cured by treatment (the assumed resolution rate with
treatment minus the background resolution rate of 40%) times the probability that the treatment
is effective (assumed here to be 0.25) times the power. Under these assumptions, Table 1 shows
the expected performance of the three sample sizes.
These calculations show that, with regard to expected clinical benefit, the smallest proposed
sample size is the most cost efficient under all the assumed cure rates, despite having low power
for some. For example, under Reviewer 3’s assumption of 50% resolution with treatment, the
advocated sample size of 388 per arm requires spending $500 for each expected future cure
produced, but the proposed sample size of 97 per arm obtains future cures at a cost of only $279
each. Clearly, if the value of a cure is enough to justify the larger study, then the smaller study is
also acceptable. We believe that reviewers should accept this conclusion, because a cure cannot
be worth more than $500 but less than $279. Importantly, we note that cures cost more for the
larger studies regardless of the assumed number of future patients or the assumed probability that
the treatment is effective (because these only scale the expected number of cures up or down
proportionally under all sample sizes). Furthermore, the larger studies would cost more per cure
even if they could be done at the same cost per patient as the small one.
Table 1.
Influence of sample size on power, projected study value, and cost efficiency. Calculations
assume an expected 100,000 persons will receive the new treatment if the study achieves p<0.05,
and that there is a 0.25 probability that the treatment has the assumed cure rate.
Performance with assumed
cure rate with new treatment equal to:
Performance measure
Power

Expected additional cures

Cost per expected cure ($)

Cures per $100,000 spent

Sample size
per arm
97
196
388
97
196
388
97
196
388
97
196
388

50%
29%
51%
80%
717
1280
2002
279
391
500
358
256
200

54%
50%
80%
98%
1741
2784
3414
115
180
293
870
557
341

60%
80%
98%
>99%
4002
4897
4999
50
102
200
2001
979
500
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Although we focus above on a particular definition of projected value, similar results hold
for any measure that exhibits diminishing marginal returns with increasing sample size, a
property that holds for many measures of projected study value that have been proposed in
connection with sample size planning, as we will establish in Section 4. But we first turn to
developing a framework for exploiting this reliable general property.
3. A framework for choosing sample size.
This section presents methods for identifying sample size choices that must be more cost
efficient than any larger choices. These are potentially appealing because they can be defended
against the frequent charge of being “inadequate”—if a larger study would be worth doing, then
so is one that is more cost efficient. Assume that all aspects of a study’s design have been fixed
and only sample size remains to be determined. Let
cn = the cost of conducting the study if sample size is n
vn = the expected scientific/clinical/practical value of the study if the sample size is n
The projected cost efficiency is then vn/cn.
The cost cn consists of the resources that must be committed in order for the study to be
completed. Some types of costs may be considered relevant from some perspectives but
irrelevant from others. Our methods can be used with whatever definition of cn is considered
most meaningful to those who are choosing the sample size or those who must be convinced that
it is an acceptable choice. The validity of our proposed methods therefore does not depend on
our advocating or precisely defining any particular perspective on what costs should be
considered or how they should be quantified. One important perspective is the broad societal
perspective that would be relevant for considering studies to be funded by governments, which
we believe would entail consideration of both financial costs and other aspects of the study’s
conduct such as risks and inconvenience to subjects. Narrower definitions could also be used;
for example, some potential funders might consider only their own direct financial costs.
Regardless of the perspective, we emphasize that cn is the cost of the study itself and does not
include costs that may be incurred later as a consequence of the study’s results. For example, the
cost of a treatment once it is adopted is not part of cn, and neither is the cost of further research
that is stimulated by the study. These would instead factor into its projected value.
Precisely quantifying vn is difficult and can also depend on a particular perspective. In
the previous section, we assumed that the projected value of a study was the expected number of
additional cures produced, and we knew the parameters needed to calculate this. But in practical
situations, an exact definition of study value will be less clear, and the knowledge needed to
accurately project it is typically unavailable. Even in the simple case of expected cures, the
projected value of the study would usually have to be modified to reflect the possibility of
unanticipated side effects and how costly the treatment will be if it is adopted. Both would
modify the net benefit of an efficacious treatment, and consequently modify the projected value
of a study that might lead to its adoption. In addition, from a broad societal perspective, such as
would be considered by reviewers of proposals for government funding, other possible benefits
will often need to be considered. For example, much of the value of studies often lies in what
they contribute to an accumulating body of knowledge, making a simple decision theoretic
definition as in Section 2 inapplicable and leaving the difficult question of what some
incremental information is worth. In particular, some studies may produce most of their value
via the new ideas or further research that they stimulate, a potential source of value that seems
particularly difficult to quantify in advance. These issues often make the projected value of a
study very difficult to calculate. They also may help explain why the MEU/VOI methods
mentioned in the Introduction have rarely been used in practice. We believe that such methods
can work well if skilfully done, but they may appear too difficult and risky to investigators,
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because reviewers can easily disagree with the many specific, quantitative assumptions that are
needed.
We therefore develop here methods that completely avoid the need to quantify projected
value. These are easy to implement and rely only on study cost and on general properties of how
sample size influences projected value. (We argue in Section 4 that the needed general
properties can be relied on without specific verification for each study.) The idea is to use a
simple stand-in function for vn that increases with n at least as fast as any reasonable definition of
vn, and then to optimize costs relative to this function.
Proposition 1. If there is a positive function f (n) and a value n* such that
c n*
c
≤ n for all n > n*
(A)
f (n*)
f (n)
and
v n*
v
≥ n for all n ≥ n* ,
(B)
f (n*) f (n)
then
v n* v n
≥
for all n ≥ n*.
c n* c n
This follows immediately from multiplying the smaller terms from A and B together and the
larger terms from A and B together, and then simplifying the resulting inequality. This leads
directly to the following proposition, which is the basis for our proposed methods.
Proposition 2. Suppose f (n) can be chosen so that condition (B) holds for any sample size
under consideration. Then choosing n* to minimize cn / f (n) selects the smallest sample size that
meets both (A) and (B) and guarantees that the most cost efficient sample size is met or
exceeded.
We propose two choices of f (n) for implementing this strategy:
f (n) = n
(1)
and
(2)
f (n) = n .
These lead to the following two sample size choices:
Definition 1: nmin is the smallest sample size that minimizes total study cost divided by sample
size, i.e., the cost per subject.
Definition 2: nroot is the smallest sample size that minimizes total study cost divided by the
square root of the sample size.
With choice (1), nmin is the smallest n* that meets condition (A), and condition (B), which we
denote as Bmin, follows if projected study value per subject is non-increasing beyond nmin. With
choice (2), nroot is the minimum n* meeting condition (A). In this case, condition (B), denoted
Broot, is stronger than Bmin, and nroot ≤ nmin. In cases where Broot holds for n* = nroot, it therefore
follows that nroot will be a more cost efficient choice than nmin.
Our results do not depend on specifying the value of the study, but do depend on specifying
the costs as a function of sample size and whether condition (B) holds. So it is important to
understand how the most cost efficient sample size behaves as a function of the cost structure,
and whether our easy-to-implement methods are likely to overshoot the most cost efficient
sample size substantially. Some relevant results are given below. These are easily verified, so
we provide a proof only for Proposition 7.
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Proposition 3. Let nopt denote the sample size maximizing vn /cn. Replacing a given cost
structure cn with c ′n = F + cn, for fixed costs F>0 that do not depend on n, can only increase nmin,
nroot, and nopt, never decrease them.
Proposition 4. Replacing a given cost structure cn with c ′n = cn + nc, for per-subject costs c>0,
can only decrease nmin, nroot, and nopt, never increase them.
Proposition 5. If cn = F + nc, then nroot = F/c and total cost at nroot is 2F.
Proposition 6. If cn = F + nc, then nroot is at least half as cost efficient as any smaller sample
size for any measure of value that is non-decreasing in n. This follows immediately from
Proposition 5.
Proposition 7. If cn = F + nc, then nroot is more than half as cost efficient as any larger sample
size for any measure of value such that Bmin holds at nroot.
The cost efficiency of nroot relative to any larger sample size n is {(F + nc)/(2F)}{ v nroot /vn }.
Condition Bmin implies v nroot /vn ≥ nroot/n. Letting r = n/nroot so that nc = rF, we see that the
relative cost efficiency therefore is no smaller than (1+r)/(2r) > 0.5.
4. Influence of sample size on projected study value.
We propose that use of nmin or nroot is reasonable in typical situations because conditions Bmin and
Broot hold under wide circumstances. In this section we consider many definitions of study value
that have been proposed in connection with sample size planning, showing that condition Bmin
holds even at very small sample sizes, and Broot holds at small sample sizes for low-priorinformation situations, when little is already known about the issue under study. We consider
frequentist and Bayesian measures of value based on decision theory, interval estimation,
information theory, and point estimation with squared error loss. Because of the predominant
role of power and classical statistical hypothesis testing in current sample size planning
conventions, we show some details for frequentist decision theory here (but with most
mathematical detail deferred to Web Appendix A). We acknowledge that other measures may be
regarded as more sensible; results for these are summarized in Section 4.4, with full details given
in Web Appendix A. Figure 1 illustrates the shapes of the sample size-value relationships.
These all show the concave shape that establishes condition Bmin.
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Figure. 1. Shapes of the relation between projected value and sample size for 10 measures of study value and
situations. For visual clarity and because only the shapes are of interest, the vertical scale varies for different curves.
Shown are curves for value proportional to: a) gain in Shannon information with n0=100, where n0 is the sample size
equivalent of the prior information; b) reciprocal of confidence interval width; c) reduction in Bayesian credible
interval width when n0=100; d) reduction in squared error versus using prior mean when n0=100; e) power for a
standardized effect size of 0.2; f) additional cures from a Bayesian clinical trial with prior means (SDs) for cure rates
of 0.4 (0.05) versus 0.4 (0.1); g) gain in Shannon information with n0=2; h) reduction in squared error versus using a
single observation; i) reduction in squared error versus using prior mean when n0=2; j) reduction in Bayesian
credible interval width when n0=2.

4.1 Decision theory using frequentist hypothesis tests.
We start with a simple situation where both the state of reality—null or alternative—and the
action to be taken as a result of the study are dichotomous, similar to a framework proposed by
Lee and Zelen (2000). Obtaining a 2-sided p-value <α in favor of the alternative will result in
“rejecting” the null in favor of the alternative, producing value k1 if the alternative is true and
value k2 if the null is true. Otherwise, we “accept” the null, producing value k3 if the null is true
and value k4 if the alternative is true. The constants k1 to k4 may be any values, but it is better to
be right than wrong, so k1≥k4 and k3≥k2. With the type I error rate fixed at α for all n and power
with a sample size of n denoted by Pn, the expected value following a two-sided statistical
hypothesis test based on a sample size of n is then
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k1θPn + k2(1-θ)α/2 + k3(1-θ)(1-α/2) + k4θ(1-Pn),
(3)
where θ is the prior probability that the alternative is true. The expected value of the study is (3)
minus its value with 0 in place of Pn, because n=0 means that we accept the null with certainty.
This difference simplifies to:

α 1 − θ k3 − k2 
.
vn = θ (k1 − k 4 ) Pn −
(4)
2 θ k1 − k 4 

If the decision does not matter under the null, then k3=k2 and value is proportional to power,
similar to the situation in Section 2. If there is pre-study equipoise in the sense that actions
corresponding to the null and alternative are equally desirable before the study because
k1θ + k2(1-θ) = k3(1-θ) + k4θ, then vn = θ(k1 – k4)(Pn - α/2) and value is nearly proportional to
power for small α. We also have vn = θ(k1 – k4)(Pn - α/2) if the action in the absence of a study is
randomized so that P0 = α/2. These results support the conventional focus on power as the
relevant quantity for sample size planning for frequentist hypothesis testing. We therefore
examine the consequences for our proposed methods of assuming that projected study value is
proportional to power.
In Web Appendix A, we provide a proof of the following proposition for the simple case of
a one-sample Z-test.
Proposition 8. For vn proportional to power with the conventional choice of α=0.05 most often
used for sample size planning, Bmin holds for all n* regardless of the effect size used to calculate
power.
For other situations, power calculations using normal approximations (the vast majority of
power calculations done in practice) produce similar results. Bacchetti, et al. (2005) examined
value proportional to power for the two-sample Z-test and discussed extensions to comparison of
proportions and to log rank tests, confirming condition Bmin. Condition Broot, however, does not
hold at small sample sizes.
4.2 Low prior information.
Having only two possibilities might be characterized as a high-prior-information situation,
because it assumes only one possible important departure from the null and that it has been
correctly specified. In practice, there is always uncertainty about the size of any departure from
the null that may exist. Although the concept of prior information is foreign to frequentist
hypothesis testing, we consider an example of a low-information situation in order to illustrate
how this can lead to Broot holding at small sample sizes. Suppose that pre-study uncertainty
about the standardized effect size ∆ follows a normal distribution with mean 0, corresponding to
equipoise, and standard deviation σ, and define projected study value as proportional to ∆Pn(∆),
where Pn(∆) is the probability of rejecting the null hypothesis ∆=0 by a 2-sided, one-sample Ztest, in favor of ∆>0. This might apply when ∆ quantifies how much a new treatment improves
on a standard in a crossover trial. This is analogous to a measure of value proposed by Detsky
(1990) for studies with a binary outcome. It is also similar to the concept of “assurance” defined
by O’Hagan, Stevens, and Campbell (2005) as the average power over a range of alternatives,
but here the value depends not only on whether the study produces p<0.05 but also on the size of
the true treatment effect. For this situation, Broot holds for n* ≥ 3 if σ = 1.0, for n* ≥ 5 if σ =
0.75, and for n* ≥ 11 if σ = 0.5. Thus, Broot holds down to fairly small sample sizes unless there
is considerable prior evidence that ∆ is likely to be small.
4.3. Performance of nroot with value proportional to power. Because power versus a single,
known alternative plays such a central role in sample size planning conventions, and value based
on this does not satisfy Broot, we note some results that nevertheless hold for nroot when study
9
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value is proportional to power at a specific alternative with α=0.05 and the cost structure is
linear, cn = F + nc. In Web Appendix B, we show that the following two propositions hold:
Proposition 9. Either nroot produces more than 90% power, or it is more cost efficient than any
sample size that does.
Proposition 10. nroot is never less than 81% as cost efficient as any larger sample size.
This sharpens the general bound given by Proposition 7. Similar to Proposition 8, Propositions 9
and 10 also hold regardless of the assumed effect size used for calculating power.
4.4 Other measures of projected value.
Despite the predominance of power-based sample size planning in applied studies, many other
measures of projected study value have been proposed for use in sample size planning. Web
Appendix A assesses conditions Bmin and Broot for several such alternatives, mainly focusing on
simple cases for normal and Bernoulli outcomes. These simple cases accord with the
assumptions typically made for sample size planning in actual practice. We note the main results
below.
For value proportional to reduction in Bayesian credible interval width from its prior
width (Joseph and Belisle, 1997; Lindley, 1997; Pham-Gia, 1997), Bmin holds for all n* and Broot
holds for n* > 1.6n0, where n0 is the sample size equivalent of the prior information. For value
inversely proportional to frequentist confidence interval width, Bmin and Broot hold for all n*. For
value proportional to the reduction in squared error loss versus using the prior mean, Bmin holds
for all n* and Broot holds for n* > n0. For value proportional to gain in Shannon information
(Bernardo, 1997), Bmin holds for all n* and Broot holds for n* > 3.9n0. These results formalize the
notion of Broot holding at small sample sizes for innovative studies, because such studies will
have low values of n0. For Bayesian decision theory (Tan and Smith, 1998; Gittins and Pezeshk,
2000a,b; Halpern, et al., 2001; Willan and Pinto, 2005), the low-prior-information case is prestudy equipoise, by which we mean equal prior means for the outcome under the two competing
treatments. Under this definition of equipoise, Bmin holds for the normal case as we show in
Web Appendix C. Numerical evaluation of many realistic cases, presented in Web Tables 1 and
2, suggests that both Bmin and Broot hold down to small sample sizes for both the normal and
Bernoulli cases under equipoise or when prior uncertainty about one or both treatments is large.
Severe enough departures from equipoise can, however, produce violations of Bmin at large
sample sizes.
Other proposed measures of value also appear to meet Bmin. Bacchetti et al. (2005) show
that Bmin holds for value proportional to the probability of seeing a rare side effect at least once.
Walker (2003) proposes a nonparametric Bayesian approach requiring Markov chain Monte
Carlo methods; the example, his Figures 1(a)-1(c), shows concavity of vn-τn for cost τ per
subject, which implies concavity of vn and condition Bmin. Tan and Smith (1998) consider a wide
variety of utility functions, including some that address side effects as well as efficacy, and all of
them show concavity (their Figures 2, 3, 5, 8-10, 12, 13).
4.5. Summary and discussion.
We suggest that the above results make it reasonable to use nmin without explicitly verifying Bmin
for each specific study. Bmin holds for all the measures considered and therefore for any
weighted combination of them. The only exceptions that we found were for decision theoretic
measures when there are departures from pre-study equipoise. Although the need for equipoise
is controversial (Freedman, 1987; Rothman and Michels, 1994; Miller and Brody, 2003), the
severe departures from our specific decision theoretic equipoise conditions that would be needed
to make nmin fall substantially short of optimal cost efficiency seem likely to raise clear ethical
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problems and to be rare in practice. In addition, Bmin holds for (4) not only under equipoise, but
also if a departure from equipoise favors the alternative; substantial departures in favor of the
null would usually mean that a study is of low interest at any sample size. Finally, we note that
the decision theoretic measures seem the least compelling in our view, because they artificially
dichotomize the outcome of the study.
The consistency of our results concerning when Broot holds also suggest no need for
specific verification for each study, beyond simply confirming that there is little known about the
issue the study addresses. Several Bayesian measures provide formal results indicating that Broot
holds when there is little prior information, and Section 4.2 and Web Tables 1 and 2 provide
additional evidence that this is a consistent phenomenon. In addition, Propositions 9 and 10
provide additional reassurance that nroot will not perform poorly, although only for the standard
measure of projected value, power.
Thus, while it may be possible to construct specialized measures of value and situations
where our methods would perform poorly, we believe that they should work well in typical
situations.
5. Further examples.
5.1. Comparison of two treatments’ cure rates.
Table 2 extends the 2-treatment comparison situation from Section 2 to seven different measures
of study value, showing the cost efficiency attained by nroot or by requiring 80% power for
various alternatives. We now assume a linear cost structure, which is more favorable toward
larger sample sizes because it implies that cost per subject decreases with increasing sample size.
We focus only on the ratio of fixed to per-subject costs, because the specific magnitude of the
costs does not impact the performance of one choice relative to optimal or to another. As
expected from Proposition 2, nroot never falls short of the most cost efficient sample size when
there is low prior information, n0=4 or equipoise. It also avoids very poor cost efficiency in all
situations, in accordance with Propositions 6 and 7, and it compares well to larger sample sizes
on the power-based measure, in accordance with Proposition 10. In contrast, the conservative
power-based choice assuming an alternative cure rate of 50% is poor for many measures under
the middle cost structure and very poor in the bottom cost structure, even for value proportional
to power. The power-based choice with the alternative specified as 60% is also poor for the
bottom cost structure for the situations with low prior information, precisely where nroot performs
well. The over-optimistic choice assuming an alternative cure rate of 0.8 performs very poorly
in the top cost structure for many measures, notably value proportional to power.
5.2. Actual grant proposals.
We recently collaborated on two proposals at opposite extremes in terms of how cost
influenced sample size choice. One concerned innovative methods for islet cell transplantation
to treat Type I diabetes with serious complications, a procedure that requires approximately
$100,000 in clinical costs per patient. Because of these costs, the proposed sample size was only
ten. This could be justified using the ideas presented here. With little already known about these
new methods, condition Broot is likely to hold down to very small sample sizes. But ten is
already more than nroot, because fixed costs are less than $1 million (see Proposition 5). So ten
should not fall short of the most cost efficient sample size: 10> nroot ≥nopt. Despite this, ten
would seem inadequate by a conventional power analysis, and the proposal was criticized for not
including one.
The other study concerned measurement of antiretroviral drug levels in hair specimens that
are already collected as part of an existing cohort study of HIV-infected women. Fixed costs that
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Table 2.
Comparison of cost efficiencies of methods for choosing sample size under different cost
structures and measures of projected study value.

Cost Structure
Measure of study value proportional to
Fixed costs are 1000 times per-subject cost, nroot=1000
Power for cure rate 60% versus 40%
Reduction in credible interval width, n0=4
Reduction in credible interval width, n0=200
Reciprocal of confidence interval width
Bayesian decision, means=40%, SDs 5%, 10%
Shannon information, n0=4
Shannon information, n0=200

% of optimal cost efficiency,
by method*
Optimal
80% power for 40% vs
n
nroot 50% 60% 80%
300
120
600
1000
152
296
914

69%
64%
95%
100%
64%
83%
100%

78%
71%
99%
99%
74%
89%
99%

93%
98%
77%
74%
99%
98%
63%

Fixed costs are 100 times per-subject cost, nroot=100
Power for cure rate 60% versus 40%
Reduction in credible interval width, n0=4
Reduction in credible interval width, n0=200
Reciprocal of confidence interval width
Bayesian decision, means=40%, SDs 5%, 10%
Shannon information, n0=4
Shannon information, n0=200

158
30
174
100
38
54
232

93%
80%
94%
100%
86%
94%
87%

41% 98% 65%
21% 58% 98%
64% 100% 67%
64% 95% 92%
24% 65% 100%
35% 76% 99%
78% 99% 60%

Fixed costs are 20 times per-subject cost, nroot=20
Power for cure rate 60% versus 40%
Reduction in credible interval width, n0=4
Reduction in credible interval width, n0=200
Reciprocal of confidence interval width
Bayesian decision, means=40%, SDs 5%, 10%
Shannon information, n0=4
Shannon information, n0=200

88
12
76
20
14
18
96

84%
95%
75%
100%
96%
100%
71%

29%
7%
44%
31%
9%
15%
59%

86%
26%
87%
58%
31%
41%
94%

34%
93%
29%
40%
86%
71%
21%

95%
71%
95%
93%
77%
87%
92%

* Chosen total n for 80% power for 40% versus 50% is 776, for 40% versus 60% is 194, for 40% versus 80% is 44.
These remain the same for all cost structures.

would be incurred regardless of sample size included considerable effort for assay development,
setting up data management and other procedures, data analysis, scientific leadership and
guidance, and presentation and publication of results. Per-specimen costs included technician
time and supplies for running the assays, entry and cleaning of data, shipping, and project
monitoring. Without formal analysis, the investigators proposed the simple choice of studying
all 5700 specimens projected to become available over the study period. This reflected the clear
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reality that set-up costs would be high, per-specimen costs would be low, and a wealth of
concomitant information would be collected by the parent study anyway, leveraging the value of
each specimen.
Developing a new source of additional specimens would be very expensive, so the proposed
sample size of 5700 was in fact equal to nmin, implying that it was more cost efficient than any
larger sample size. Clearly, increasing sample size was not viable, and decreasing it much would
also appear likely to worsen cost efficiency, failing to fully exploit the development of the assays
and the freely available concomitant information on the subjects. The choice of nmin reflects
these facts and provides justification for the proposed sample size. In contrast, power-based
sample size calculations would be very unlikely to produce this obvious choice unless
specifically manipulated to do so. This proposal was also criticized for failing to show 80%
power for one of its aims. These two cases exemplify reviewers’ current tendency to criticize
sample size choices, even when cost considerations leave little real doubt about what is best.
6. Discussion.
Setting a goal that must be reached at any cost is often impractical. If there were a minimum
sample size that was necessary for a study to have any value at all, then a study should either be
done right or not at all, and costs would not be relevant. But power and other measures of
projected value that have been proposed for use in sample size planning do not produce any such
necessary minimum. We therefore see no justification for making ≥80% power an absolute
requirement, which would preclude use of our approach or other alternatives. Instead, these
measures all exhibit the properties that justify our simple approach for incorporating costs in
sample size planning. We have shown that planners can rely on nmin being more cost efficient
than any larger sample size. For innovative studies, nroot will also have this very desirable
property. Our approach also has the following important strengths.
6.1. Strengths of the proposed approach.
Reliable. By choosing sample size based on properties that hold for any of the measures of
projected value considered here, we avoid relying entirely on a single definition and avoid the
risk of being misled by incorrectly specified inputs, such as the assumed difference for
calculating power. In addition, costs are a requisite ingredient in most trial planning and seem
easier to reliably project in detail than eventual scientific or practical value, which depends on
the unknown factors that are to be studied. Also, improved cost efficiency is an acceptable goal
in a wide variety of situations. Thus, uncertainty or disagreement in any of these areas will not
invalidate our approach. Furthermore, Propositions 6, 7, and 10 provide assurance that nroot will
not be disastrously bad if the cost structure is linear. Although the bound of 50% of optimal may
seem weak, the daunting uncertainties often present in sample size planning situations make cost
efficiencies of much less than 50% a real danger under conventional approaches. For example, in
Table 2 the power-based choices dip well below 50% of optimal in many situations and one
reaches as low as 7% of optimal.
Defensible. Our method justifies the choice of small sample sizes in situations such as high persubject cost and low prior information, where such a choice is often unavoidable on practical
grounds but cannot be justified by power considerations. Combined with the results in Section 4,
Proposition 1 ensures that nmin is more cost efficient than any larger sample size, as is nroot when
the study is innovative in the sense of having low prior information. Furthermore, Proposition 9
shows that nroot will generally be more cost efficient than the sample size producing 90% power,
even under a cost structure and definition of value that are favorable toward larger sample sizes.
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Because reviewers frequently criticize sample size as too small, these properties make nmin and
nroot viable choices for investigators fearful of such criticism.
Easy to use. Proposition 5 shows that nroot is particularly easy to calculate if costs are linear.
Finding nmin will often just require estimating how many subjects can be studied before
encountering a cost barrier, such as the need to open another site. We suspect that investigators
are already familiar with using such projections to pick sample sizes (this is the first step in what
Goodman and Berlin (1994) described as a “sample size game”). Costs usually must be
projected as part of a study proposal anyway. We do note that costs to society not included in
proposals may be important, such as risks to study subjects, time spent planning the study, and
publishing costs. Propositions 3 and 4 indicate the qualitative impacts that these should have on
sample size choice. These wider costs still seem easier to quantify than projected value. A
possible exception is risks to subjects, but if these are ignored in calculating nmin or nroot, then
Proposition 4 ensures that our approach is still guaranteed not to fall short of the most cost
efficient sample size defined with risks included.
Promotes innovation. Astute clients sometimes ask, “How can we calculate a sample size when
no one has studied this before?” Conventional approaches provide no good answer, instead
resorting to arbitrary values or meaningless standardized effect sizes that have nothing to do with
the study. Preliminary data can mitigate this problem but may be unavailable for very innovative
studies. Indeed, an overemphasis on preliminary data has been recognized as a barrier to
innovation by a National Institutes of Health task force, which wrote: “an obsession with
preliminary data discriminates against bold new ideas, against young scientists, and against risk
taking. For new ideas, little or no preliminary data may be required”
(http://cms.csr.nih.gov/NewsandReports/ReorganizationActivitiesChannel/BackgroundUpdatesa
ndTimeline/FinalPhase1Report.htm, accessed 10 March 2007). Unfortunately, reduced
expectations concerning preliminary data still would not help innovators with the practical
problem of choosing and justifying a sample size. But nroot is a viable solution: it is especially
applicable to innovative studies and provides a sensible and defensible choice without a need for
any preliminary data.
6.2. Additional remarks.
Following much of the literature on sample size planning using costs (e.g., Detsky, 1990;
Bernardo, 1997; Halpern, et al., 2001; Willan and Pinto, 2005), we focus on linear cost structure
in Table 2 and some propositions. This simple assumption implies constant marginal costs as
sample size increases, which may be reasonably realistic for many studies, but may in some
cases be unduly favorable toward larger sample sizes. In practice, there may be a limited number
of the most convenient, easily studied subjects, and costs will increase more than linearly when
sample size exceeds that number.
Our analysis does not imply that very large studies cannot be justified. For a study
addressing an important issue, a very large sample size may produce value greater than cost even
when it is much larger than the most cost efficient sample size. If the issue is important enough,
the resulting return on investment, while less than the maximum possible, may nevertheless
exceed what is possible for investigations on other topics that might be funded instead. In this
case, money spent to exceed the most cost efficient sample size will still be well spent.
Universal use of nmin or nroot therefore would not produce a society-wide optimum return on
research spending. We do not advocate that our proposed choices be mandatory for every study,
only that they should be regarded as acceptable whenever a larger sample size would be
acceptable. We also note that the first example in Section 5.2 illustrates how our ideas could be
used to defend a sample size that exceeds nroot. On the other hand, we also emphasize that
nothing we have proposed prevents use of smaller sample sizes if these are suggested by other
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approaches or considerations. In general, we advocate more tolerance of different sample size
planning approaches, not adoption of the proposals here as a new rigid standard.
We have focused here on studies with fixed sample sizes; consideration of adaptive designs
is beyond the scope of this paper. Although group sequential designs are a long-established
approach for potentially improving cost efficiency, they are not feasible in all situations, and
many studies are carried out with fixed sample sizes. This is particularly true for small,
innovative studies where nroot is most applicable. Funding for the maximum sample size must be
committed in full at the outset for sequential studies, and costs when stopping early will likely
exceed what they would have been for a study with a planned end at the same point. In addition,
sequential studies may still be inherently less cost efficient than smaller studies. In the example
from Section 2, adding standard interim analyses (O’Brien and Fleming, 1979) to the studies
with doubled or quadrupled sample size would not reduce their expected cost per expected cure
down to that of the smallest study, even if they could be carried out at the same cost per subject.
Finally, we note that sequential or other adaptive designs could still be used when the maximum
possible sample size has been chosen as nmin or nroot instead of by a conventional power
calculation. .
6.3. Conclusion.
The proposals here run counter to some established ideas about sample size planning, but we
believe that our approach is nevertheless reasonable and promising. It has the potential to
improve allocation of research funding, promote innovation, and save much investigator,
reviewer, and statistician time that is currently wasted justifying and evaluating sample size
under standards that are often unrealistic and too inflexible. We hope that this paper will lead to
more tolerance of alternatives to the rigid conventions that seem to have a stranglehold on
practices concerning sample size planning.
Supplementary Materials
Web Appendices and Tables referenced in Section 4 are available under the Paper Information
link at the Biometrics website http://www.tibs.org/biometrics.
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Bacchetti, McCulloch and Segal (BMS) argue for an approach to sample size planning for
clinical trials based on maximizing “cost efficiency” defined as vn/cn where vn is the expected
scientific, clinical, or practical value of the study if the sample size is n and cn is the cost of
conducting a study with sample size n. They give examples of plausible definitions of vn which
increase less than linearly with n. For such functions, the increase in value per unit increase in
cost ultimately declines, although it may increase with n for small sample sizes because of a
fixed study set-up cost. For example, in comparing a new treatment to control with a normally
distributed endpoint and known variance, one might define vn as the power for detecting a mean
difference δ at significance level α. This can be written
δ

(1)
vn = Φ
n − k1−α 
 2σ

where Φ denotes the standard normal cdf, k1-α denotes the 1-α percentile of the standard normal
distribution and n is the total sample size for the two arms of the study. Figure 1 shows this
power as a function of n for δ/2σ = 0.5 and α=0.025. Figure 2 shows vn /(10+n) which would be
the form of the cost efficiency function if the set-up cost were equivalent to the cost of treating
10 patients. In this case, the optimum cost efficiency is seen to occur at a sample size of about 20
patients, although the power for such a study would only be about .61 even for a large treatement
effect δ/2σ = 0.5 .
Statisticians are very familiar with the fact that power increases at a decreasing rate with
increasing sample size. The same is true for the width of a confidence interval for treatment
difference. Nevertheless, the argument that such a “cost efficiency” measure is appropriate for
sample size planning is not compelling. For example, a company with a single indication product
to clinically develop may be best served by funding the largest study that they can afford in order
to show that the product is statistically significantly better than the control. Obtaining regulatory
approval for marketing based on large power for a small treatment effect may be in the financial
interest of the company, not performing a small “cost efficient” study. Even in cases where the
value measure vn is an appropriate reflection of utility of the study, maximizing value subject to
restrictions on resources may result in very different decisions than maximizing the “cost
efficiency” ratio described by BMS. In general, study value and study costs are incommensurate
and not usefully combined except in the sense that the studies that maximize value within the
limits of resources are those that should be undertaken (Anscombe, 1963).
The proposal for using sample sizes based on cost efficiency reflects an attempt to improve the
allocation of resources among competing opportunities. Allocation of public funds for
biomedical research should take into account the opportunity costs. That is, the funds provided
for one proposal are not available for other proposals. This is also true for much private sector
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research. Effectively allocating resources among disparate projects must, however, consider the
disparate objectives of the projects and the likelihood that they will achieve their objectives. For
therapeutics development, effective resource allocation strategies should utilize sequentially
accumulating information; this is the purpose of phased clinical development. Phase I and II
clinical trials are undertaken to determine which treatments warrant phase III clinical trials and to
optimize the regimens and target populations for those that are undertaken. Several phase II
design strategies have been proposed to take opportunity costs into account directly. Strauss and
Simon (1995) proposed a sequence of two-arm randomized phase II trials, selecting the “winner”
at each trial for carry-over to the next trial, to optimally utilize a horizon of N patients in a
manner that maximized the expected effectiveness of the treatment selected at the end. They
showed that the best sample size in each trial depended on the distribution of treatment effects; if
there are treatments with large effects, it is better to perform a large number of small phase II
studies than a small number of large phase II studies. Whitehead (1985, 1986), Yao et al. (1996),
Yao and Venkatraman (1998), and Wang and Leung (1998) described similar approaches based
on a series of single arm pilot trials.
There can be no meaningful one-size fits all rule for sizing randomized clinical trials.
Randomized clinical trials, including those involving randomization between a new regimen and
a control have an important role as developmental phase II studies. This is increasingly true in
oncology today where endpoints such as time-to-disease progression and the contribution of new
drugs to existing regimens cannot be meaningfully evaluated in single arm trials (Korn et al.,
2001). The endpoints, significance threshold for judging a treatment as promising, and sample
size planning for such developmental trials should be based on different considerations than for
phase III trials whose objectives are to potentially change medical practice. For example, Simon
et al. proposed using ranking and selection theory (Simon, Wittes and Ellenberg, 1985). Simon et
al. (2001) and Rubinstein et al. (2005) proposed using elevated thresholds for statistical
significance in some randomized developmental trials. Randomized developmental trials of
therapeutic regimens with a strong biological basis should be encouraged, not prevented because
they do not fit the mold appropriate for sizing phase III trials.
When it comes time to conduct a phase III trial, there is usually strong interest in obtaining a
definitive result. Large multi-center clinical trials are often difficult to organize, in part because
many investigators would rather perform their own single center studies (Simon, 1994). Many
published studies report “suggestive” non-statistically significant treatment effects but have too
small a sample size to be considered negative. Such trials may be of value in guiding further
research or in contributing to meta-analyses, but are in themselves not interpretable for medical
decision making. BMS are correct that the usual approach to sizing phase III trials is imperfect
on many counts. It certainly is subjective with regard to the size of treatment effect to be
detected. In comparing a new treatment to a control, there is usually a difference δmin of the
primary endpoint considered to be the minimal medical benefit, in the sense that smaller
differences for that endpoint would not be worth the known and unknown risks of adverse effects
for other endpoints. Even if there were no subjectivity in specifying δmin , providing 90% power
for rejecting the null hypothesis when the treatment effect is δmin does not ensure that treatments
found statistically significant have effectiveness greater than δmin .There are also rather serious
concerns about whether the standard frequentist approach provides an appropriate context for
utilizing previous information (Spiegelhalter, Freedman and Parmar, 1994) . For example, for
some confirmatory trials, the usual 0.05 level may be too stringent (Parmar, Ungerleider and
Simon, 1996). On the other hand, for a treatment regimen with a small prior probability of
success, even a statistically significant (p<0.05) result will be associated with a large posterior
18
http://biostats.bepress.com/cobra/art55

probability of being a false positive and will require confirmation in a follow-up study (Simon,
2000). Using the Bayesian paradigm and planning sample size to assure that results are
convincing to both skeptics and enthusiasts will often require much larger sample sizes than the
standard frequentist approach (Spiegelhalter et al., 1994). On the other hand, maximizing utility
to patients included in the trial and the horizon of patients who may utilize a new approved
treatment in some cases supports smaller clinical trials; large treatment effects are easy to detect
with small sample sizes and treatments with small effects have limited impact on utility except
when large numbers of patients are influenced by the trial (Anscombe, 1963; Begg and Mehta,
1979; Colton, 1963).
The large randomized phase III clinical trial has served society very well. It is not, however, a
proper prescription for all situations. The future of medicine will emphasize therapeutics
molecularly targeted to the intrinsic causes of disease pathogenesis and utilize predictive
diagnostics to select treatments for patients. The implicit assumption of past clinical trials that
qualitative treatment by covariate interactions are unlikely will be inappropriate for many new
clinical trials; in many cases, qualitative interactions will be likely. New clinical trial designs and
analysis strategies will be needed and biostatisticians will need to learn to move from a
retrospective correlative science mode of operation to a prospective predictive medicine mode
(Freidlin and Simon, 2005; Jiang, Freidlin and Simon, 2007; Simon, 2004, 2007; Simon and
Maitournam, 2006)}. Many of the small treatment effects observed in past studies were probably
due to the heterogeneity of the patients being treated in the same clinical trial and the absence of
biological tools for adequately diagnosing and characterizing disease. The wealth of new tools
offered by genomics and biotechnology provide great opportunities to dramatically improve
therapeutics. Randomized clinical trials will continue to be important, but new ways of designing
them and sizing them will be developed. The exciting scientific challenges available to
biostatisticians involved in therapeutics today require clarity about the objectives of specific
trials and innovative thinking about design and analysis strategies appropriate to those
objectives.
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Discussion of “Simple, Defensible Sample Sizes Based on Cost Efficiency,” by
P. Bacchetti, C.E. McCulloch, and M.R. Segal

Peter Müller and Gary L. Rosner,
Department of Biostatistics,
The University of Texas, M. D. Anderson Cancer Center
Houston, TX 77030, U.S.A
Bacchetti, McCulloch, and Segal (BMS) criticize the current emphasis on power when
choosing a sample size for research involving human subjects. The authors argue that focusing
solely on power considerations may prevent researchers from carrying out studies that would
produce useful data. Rather than focusing on power, BMS contend that one should focus on
return on investment. BMS give rules that apply when the functions governing the cost and
projected return from a study satisfy certain criteria. These criteria basically imply the condition
that per-person cost increases with sample size faster than does per-person study reward. Based
on this condition, a smaller study may well be more cost efficient and, therefore, justifiable, when
compared to a larger but less cost efficient study.
We congratulate these authors for bringing forward a new critical approach for evaluating
study proposals. We agree that power considerations are not the only measures that we
statisticians can bring to bear when considering whether or not a study is worth doing. We have a
few points to add.
First, let us reconsider the motivating example BMS describe. Three reviewers are
evaluating a proposed randomized clinical study. The study proposes a new form of therapy that
the investigators think will cure some of the patients with a disease. It turns out that the disease
goes away on its own in 40% of the patients. The proposal hypothesizes that the new treatment
may cure one-third of the remaining 60% of patients with the disease. If so, then the overall
fraction cured will increase by 20% from 40% to 60%. The proposal calls for enrolling 97
patients per treatment group in order to have 80% power to detect this alternative.
The three reviewers each have different ideas about the propriety of the proposed sample
size. While one reviewer agrees with the study investigators, the other two reviewers suggest that
the study be powered to have 80% to detect smaller treatment differences. BMS go on to present
the sample sizes that correspond to each reviewers wish. They then consider the future value of
the study if the treatment is adopted and the three respective treatment effects are true. Using
some simple cost considerations and assuming that each alternative treatment effect has
probability 25% of being correct, BMS show that the original proposal with the smallest total
sample size is the most cost efficient. Since the smallest sample size is most cost efficient, the
three reviewers should be willing to accept the proposal as originally presented. In other words,
cost efficiency rather than power should be the criterion by which to judge the proposal.
There are some problems with this approach. Consider the paper’s Table 1, in which
BMS compare the smaller proposed study to the larger studies suggested by two of the
reviewers. The table shows that the smaller study is more cost efficient than the larger ones, in
that the smaller study is associated with a greater number of expected cures per $100,000 spent.
Of course, there is nothing to stop a comparison with a fourth reviewer who feels that a doubling
of the cure percentage is the only level of efficacy that is worth detecting. A study with just 22
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patients per treatment arm will have 80% power to detect a difference between 0.4 and
0.8. If this study costs just $40,000, and if we still assuming probability of 25% that the
treatment is effective at the alternative rate, then this study would lead to 20,000 expected cures
per $100,000 spent, making it more cost efficient than even the proposed study. Even if one
believes that there is only a 10% chance that the new treatment cures 80% of the patients, the
expected number of additional cures is 3200 at $13 per expected cure or 8000 expected cures per
$100,000 spent. Even if this study with just 22 patients per treatment arm would cost $100,000—
one-half the cost of the proposed study—this small study would lead to 3200 expected additional
cures per $100,000, making it even more cost efficient than the proposal’s study. One wonders
whether any study is so small that it would not pass the BMS criterion of being cost efficient.
Possible alternative strategies can be based on acknowledging additional uncertainties
and the nature of the study. For example, one could remove the arbitrariness in the choice of the
point alternative by including prior judgement on the unknown parameter. This allows the
investigator to consider Bayesian power, based on averaging power with respect to the prior
(Spiegelhalter et al., 2004, Section 6.5.3). Another direction of addressing the issues highlighted
in the motivating example is to recognize that the study is not carried out in isolation. In most
settings the new therapy is competing for resources with other studies. There is a tradition of
literature that explicitely addresses such an extended setting and considers a sequence of studies
in the same disease area, with comparable eligible population etc. See, for example, Stout and
Hardwick (2005) and Ding et al. (2007), and references therein.
Another aspect of the proposed approach is highlighted by the implication on posterior
probabilities. The ratio of power and significance level is essentially the Bayes factor
(conditioning on the event that the data falls into the rejection region of the test). Under the
Bayesian paradigm the Bayes factor summarizes the evidence in favor of the alternative
hypothesis. A method that does not protect power might recommend treatments with very small
evidence in favor of the recommended treatment.
Basically, BMS substitute one possibly short-sighted criterion, namely power, for another
criterion, one that is quite a lot vaguer. It would seem more appropriate to consider utility
associated with each action (sample size), accounting for the possible benefits, costs, and
weighting each by the a priori probability, uncertainty, or belief associated with each possible
treatment effect.
Another problem with this example is that the new treatment will not necessarily be
adopted. Adoption likely depends to a large extent on the results of the clinical trial. The clinical
community will almost certainly not adopt the new treatment if the study does not show a
significant difference. If the minimum difference that is clinically meaningful is a 10% difference
in cures, then having high probability of detecting this difference may make sense. Furthermore,
not every treatment difference is as likely as the other.
The two examples in the paper do not really help bolster the arguments, either. The first
example concerns a presumably clinical study of ten patients with Type I diabetes who will
undergo islet cell transplantation. The treatment is expensive, necessitating the small sample
size. Thus, the arguments in favor of the study should reflect the potential benefit in terms of
knowledge and development of future therapies benefitting patients with Type I diabetes. While
BMS indicate that there were criticisms of the proposal’s lack of a power calculation, they do not
tell us if the grant received funding. If it did, then the reviewers clearly were not considering the
worth of a study based solely on power.
The second example involves a proposal to take hair samples from selected individuals in
an existing cohort of study participants. It is not clear whether the hair samples are or will be
available for study as part of the existing cohort study’s protocol. Neither of these examples are
randomized comparative clinical trials for which questions of equipoise are relevant. Instead,
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they are examples of situations in which one would argue that some information is better than no
information and, possibly in the second case, the data are already available.
Of course we agree with BMS in their criticism of a rigid insistence on an absolute 80%
power requirement. We would rather avoid addressing the identified limitations by replacing
them with another set of rigid requirements. Instead we recommend an approach that
acknowledges the context of a study and tries to build a justification that is based on the
inferential or decision problem that the study addresses. The two actual grant proposals reported
by BMS are good examples in which to apply such a strategy. For the diabetes trial with the high
per-patient cost and n = 10, one could focus on the nature of the study as an exploratory study
that will hopefully provide the information to facilitate a later confirmatory trial. Taking this
perspective, we would be led to consider a decision-theoretic approach with a utility function
that includes a stylized description of a future confirmatory trial and the possible outcomes. The
utility function would include a large reward in the event of a significant outcome of the future
trial, as well as a sampling cost for the future trial. The sample size of the future trial would be
determined by the usual power argument. The final reward and the sampling cost would be
appropriately weighted and averaged with respect to both the posterior predictive distribution at
the end of the current trial and the prior predictive for the outcomes of the 10 patients. The
averaging with respect to the future sample size would include zero when results from the
current study do not support launching a follow-up study. The description sounds far more
complicated than the actual implementation. See, for example, the utility function that is used in
Rossell et al. (2007) for details.
In the case of the HIV study, one could recognize the aim of the study as scientific
learning about the antiretroviral drug levels. If we formalize the goal of scientific learning as
reducing the length of a confidence interval, then we could justify the sample size by the need to
achieve a desired confidence interval width. As BMS point out in the discussion of other
measures of projected value, this view is consistent with their proposal.
In summary, we congratulate BMS on a stimulating and very necessary critical
discussion of the unreflected use of traditional power requirements. We agree with many of their
arguments but would like to caution against an uncritical use of any single alternative criterion.
We expect BMS might agree with this advice.
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When introducing the notion of sample size estimation we sometimes like to share the story of
the statistician whose response to the question: “How many subjects do I need for my study?”
was a Socratic-like: “How many bricks does it take to build a wall?” The answer of course
depends on what kind of wall one seeks to build.
Bacchetti, McCulloch and Segal (BMS) put forward a new architecture for wall building. Their
paper is a welcome call to others to more explicitly consider cost perspectives when planning the
size of trials. The blueprints are impressive and the wall is touted as being designed in a costeffective manner. However, at the end of the day one is left with a nagging concern about its
functionality.
Different types of studies have different purposes. For example, a clinical trial might be
considered either exploratory or confirmatory depending upon whether it is an early phase study
to generate data which will support further investigation or a late phase study designed to
corroborate promising preliminary results. The requirement for the latter is typically demanding
in that its intent is to affect medical practice and a strong wall is needed to support that
enterprise. As Peto Collins and Gray (1995) note, “The medical importance of treatment effects
that are only moderate in size implies the need for large-scale randomized evidence (…) Reliable
detection or refutation of moderate differences requires negligible biases and small random
errors.“
Given finite resources, and the fact that few treatments pay for themselves, the minimum
‘clinically significant’ delta is sometimes considered as “the degree of treatment benefit that, if it
were true, would make adopting the new treatment worth the extra “cost”. The pre-trial
assessment as to how large a benefit the treatment might actually produce is a separate matter,
arrived at from biological and empirical considerations. In BMS’s example in section 2, the
investigator’s (and reviewer 1’s) ‘best estimate’ -- a 20 percentage point treatment benefit -- was
based solely on biological theory; reviewer 2’s was also, but was more conservative at 14 points.
Reviewer 3, on the other hand, focused on a (minimum) “clinically significant difference,” a
benefit of 10 percentage points ( all agreed on this value) and considered the (higher) estimates
provided by all the experts to be irrelevant. Presumably, the projected “costs” of the treatment –
as it would be used in practice -- had already been considered when arriving at this minimum
clinically significant difference.
The sharp contrast between the viewpoint of reviewer 3 and that of the others should not be
taken as a reason to reject both approaches, and thus leave the matter unresolved. Rather, this
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divergence of viewpoints could be taken as a call to clarify how to proceed in such
circumstances. We expect that the rational choice can be shown to be a function of the phase of
the investigation, whether there are likely to be other trials of this treatment if the proposed study
is “negative” or “inconclusive,” and other (non-mathematical) considerations. The consequences
arising from uncertainty in the clinical and the biological deltas could be built into the sample
size calculations using a Bayesian approach, as well as monitored through the use of interim
analysis.
BMS do not further address these issues. Rather the remainder of their paper is used to arrive at
and use a metric to justify that a sample size that has less than 50% power against a given delta
may be as (or more) defensible as one that has 80% power against this same delta. Their focus is
on the costs of doing the study and on robust (omnibus) value functions. We fear that
investigators may adopt this focus merely to avoid confronting the unpleasant realities regarding
sample sizes. We believe that investigators should plan the size of the study so as to have a high
probability of influencing the subsequent course of action.
We agree that the most commonly used sample size procedures do not explicitly consider a
study’s value or its costs, whereas their procedure attempts to do so. However, the way in which
the procedure does this needs to be carefully considered. In particular they state (section 3
second paragraph) “ …we emphasize that cn is the cost of the study itself and does not include
costs that may be incurred later as a consequence of the study’s results.” For most consumers of
a study’s results, that is a very narrow perspective, likely too narrow. However, we are told that
the neglected costs can be considered to be part of a study’s value.
Although BMS state that there are circumstances where they remain tolerant of designs with
larger sample sizes (second paragraph, section 6.2) they also state (same location) that their
smaller sample size choices should be “ … acceptable whenever a larger sample size would be
acceptable.” Since accrual is typically a challenge in most RCTs, adoption of the proposed
methods would seem to raise the potential for a lowest common denominator effect with
investigators planning large studies being challenged for doing so. One is reminded of the article
by Gehan and Freireich (1974) over 30 years ago which questioned the appropriateness (again
largely on the grounds of efficiency) of randomization in certain cancer clinical trials. Meier
(1975) recounts that several investigators who were planning what seemed to him to be wellconceived randomized trials, questioned him on whether it had been shown that they were
mistaken. Meier went on to show that the allure of the Gehan and Freireich approach was quite
limited in that it held only under rather rare circumstances. BMS maintain that their approach
holds for any projected value measure that exhibits diminishing marginal returns with increasing
sample size. However, since we still seem to be struggling with the issue of how we can improve
the translation of research findings into practice, the question of realistic measures of projected
value remains an open one for many of us.
BMS tell us their approach is based on “return on investment” but it is not always clear who is
investing, what other proposals are competing for the funds, and to whom the returns accrue. In
many countries, the funds for health research are raised from the same general taxes that are used
to pay for universal health care. However, the sample size and economic considerations are quite
different if viewed from the perspective of the developer of a treatment -- who stands to benefit
financially if it is shown to be successful -- than from that of the government sponsor of the
study who is also the payer of the costs of the treatment if it is adopted.
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Some less-statistically sophisticated investigators treat sample size considerations as an exercise
in creative arithmetic. Although impressed with the mathematical aesthetics of the current paper,
we worry about giving such investigators arguments to be even more creative in mathematically
defending even smaller sample sizes.
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Rejoinder for discussions of “Simple, Defensible Sample Sizes Based on Cost Efficiency”

Projected Value / Cost

We thank the discussants for considering our paper and offering their insights, and we appreciate
this opportunity to respond to their concerns. They do not appear to question the logic behind
our proposals or the case we made for the applicability of conditions Bmin and Broot. The only
aspect of our argument that is directly questioned appears to be the relevance of cost efficiency.
We also note some concern about seemingly unappealing hypothetical cases and possible
negative consequences. Before addressing specific points, we first turn to a cross-cutting issue
that seems relevant for many of the concerns about our proposal.
We carefully described our proposed sample sizes as “acceptable” rather than “better”
throughout the paper, and we explicitly stated in Section 6.2 that “we advocate more tolerance of
different sample size planning approaches, not adoption of the proposals here as a new rigid
standard.” Nevertheless, the discussants (especially Müller and Rosner) all seem to have some
concern about what our proposals might rule out. We therefore re-emphasize here that our
proposed methods are not designed to produce the one correct sample size, and they do not imply
that all other choices are unacceptable. They provide a simple way to determine a sample size
that cannot be validly criticized as too small. This does not imply that any larger sample size
must be too large. We explicitly noted in Section 6.2 that both larger and smaller studies can be
justified, and we now provide Figure 1 to illustrate this for larger studies.
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Figure 1. Illustration of how sample sizes much larger than that with optimal cost efficiency can be justifiable. The
thick solid line shows the cost efficiencies attained by different sample sizes for a very valuable study, while the
“competing studies” line shows the cost efficiencies for other studies on less important topics or based on ideas with
less potential. The sample size with 95% power is well beyond the peak in the cost efficiency curve, but it is still
projected to produce twice as much value as it costs (horizontal dashed line), a 100% return on investment. It
therefore may be justifiable, because the spending to exceed optimal cost efficiency produces more value than
saving that money and instead using it to fund the competing studies, which are only projected to return about 15%
more value than their cost even at their most cost efficient sample sizes.

Our methods assume that a sample size should be considered acceptable if it is more cost
efficient than another sample size that is considered acceptable. This seems unassailable, and we
tried to make this very clear and concrete in the example of Section 2: How can obtaining
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expected cures at a cost of $500 each be acceptable while obtaining them at $279 each is a waste
of taxpayer money? Nevertheless, Simon questions the relevance of cost efficiency, citing as
support an example where it could be desirable to go beyond the most cost efficient sample size.
To clarify why this does not invalidate consideration of cost efficiency, we add some more detail
to flesh out an extreme version of what we believe he has in mind.
Suppose the company has only one potential product and is planning a make or break
study that will lead either to marketing the product at huge profits or to bankruptcy. They
believe that spending 1/10 of what they can afford will produce 99% power, but they have
absolutely no other possible use for the remaining money that will produce anything of value to
them. Under these extreme (and unrealistic) assumptions, spending the remaining 9/10 of the
money on the study could in theory be justified, even though the rate of return can only be about
1/900 of the return on the first 1/10, because failing to do so means that the remaining 9/10 will
produce no value at all. But this does not mean that the study using only 1/10 of the funds would
be a poor investment and that it is so flawed that it would be better to do no study at all. Our
methods only require that better cost efficiency should protect a study from the all-too-common
charge of being fatally flawed due to “inadequate” sample size, not that the sample size must be
considered better than any other choice.
Our methods do not address the issue Simon raises of maximizing value subject to
restrictions. If the resources for a given study have already been determined, then of course the
investigators should just do the best they can within that constraint, and the problem of choosing
a sample size does not arise (although they would still need to justify their sample size in terms
of 80% power under current standards). Adjusting sample sizes of multiple studies so that they
fit together optimally is beyond the scope of our methods—and also not typically addressed by
investigators or reviewers. Our methods also do not directly address allocating funds among
multiple studies, but we believe that they could help improve the cost efficiency of such
allocations over current practices. They provide investigators with a way to find and justify
reasonably cost efficient sample sizes. Perhaps more importantly, if accepted in practice they
would often remove distracting quibbles about assumptions and power from the review process,
permitting more attention to focus on more important determinants of whether a study is worth
funding, such as the importance of the topic area for public health and/or scientific knowledge,
the quality and innovation of the basic idea behind the proposal, and whether the design is
vulnerable to serious bias. Our impression is that reviewers often implicitly assume that all of a
study’s potential value will be realized if power is at least 80% and none of it will be realized if
power is any less. This is so inaccurate that it seems bound to distort the allocation of research
funds.
We are not sure whether Simon intends his Figures 1 and 2 as a counterexample showing
that our methods do not work well. If producing a sample size with only 61% power is
considered to invalidate our approach, then it would appear that circular logic will leave us
locked into the current absolute requirement for 80% power. We believe instead that his Figures
illustrate a situation where 61% power is acceptable because of cost efficiency considerations.
Müller and Rosner extend our example of Section 2 to an even smaller sample size,
raising the spectre that our methods can justify any sample size no matter how small. We agree
that their very small study could be justified if it would only cost $40,000 ($909 per subject),
because this is less per subject than the other sample sizes and Proposition 1 would apply. This
is not the case, however, when the very small study costs $100,000 ($2273/subject, much more
than the $1031/subject for the study with 97 per arm). Their calculations showing better cost
efficiency only apply if the cure rate of 80% versus 40% is assumed to be the correct alternative.
If we instead assume 60% versus 40%, then the very small study is only 65% as cost efficient as
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the one with 97 per arm. Such reliance on specific assumptions about projected value is exactly
what our proposed methods avoid. They remain reliable for any assumed alternative.
Müller and Rosner appear to skirt close to defending the status quo when they write, “A
method that does not protect power might recommend treatments with very small evidence in
favor of the recommended treatment.” This appears to be concerned with a decision-theoretic
point of view, in which case what matters is the action taken and its consequences, not the
evidence for the action taken. We note that the chance of incorrectly recommending the
alternative is the same regardless of power—it is (1-θ)α/2 in our notation from Section 4.1—and
the real-world consequences of this are not mitigated or exacerbated according to whether the
power would have been high or low if the alternative had been true instead of the null. If the
concern is instead with how much information the study will provide, then some of the other
measures of value we examined are relevant. All of those have the properties needed by our
methods.
For our examples in Section 5.2, Müller and Rosner suggest alternative approaches to
justifying sample size based on the knowledge to be gained and the fact that some information is
better than none. We agree that these are reasonable arguments to make, but we suspect that
many investigators would regard using these instead of power-based arguments to be peerreview suicide—and they might be right. Even if reviewers do not regard perceived flaws in
sample size justifications as fatal, they may rate proposals lower, often with tangible
consequences. Strong defensibility, such as our methods provide, seems to be necessary in the
current climate.
Many of the methods that Müller and Rosner advocate appear to be along the lines of the
Bayesian MEU/VOI (maximum expected utility/value of information) methods we discussed in
Section 1 and the value measures we mentioned in Section 4.2. As stated, we regard such
methods as more thoughtful than the prevailing power-based approaches. Unfortunately, such
approaches have had seemingly little impact on actual practice. The apparent reluctance of
investigators to use such methods may stem from the need for many specific assumptions about
benefits, costs, and a priori probabilities, along with how vulnerable such assumptions are to
disagreement from reviewers. With complete specification of assumptions, cost efficiency could
be precisely defined. We argued in Sections 3 and 4 and Web Appendix A, however, that our
methods can do reasonably well without relying on such specific assumptions. We do not
understand why Müller and Rosner appear to equate this robustness with vagueness. This is a
key strength of our approach—it avoids the difficulties and controversies that come with trying
to specifically quantify projected value.
Hanley and Shapiro object to how we have handled the cost of the treatment, should it be
adopted, in our definition of cost efficiency. We regarded the cost of the treatment as one
determinant of its potential net benefit, and its potential net benefit as the source of the study’s
projected value. This matches the handling of costs and net benefits in a recent retrospective
study of the cost effectiveness of clinical trials (Johnston, et al., 2006). We are unclear on
exactly how Hanley and Shapiro would modify this framework.
Hanley and Shapiro also worry that our methods could cause large studies to be
challenged. This relates to the second paragraph, above. We also remark that studies seeking
huge commitments of resources should be challenged and very carefully justified, and the effort
to thoughtfully perform a MEU/VOI analysis seems most justified for such proposals. They also
worry that our methods could help investigators justify “even smaller” sample sizes. We agree
that in some circumstances our methods will justify smaller sample sizes. Of course, we feel that
this is correct for the reasons advocated in our paper. We also note that investigators already
have ample incentives to make their sample sizes as large as they can, including a better chance
of publishing in more prestigious journals and less chance of having the sample size challenged.
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We agree that unpleasant realities about sample size planning should be confronted, but
we believe that these go well beyond difficulties in specifying an effect size and that they should
be confronted by statisticians and reviewers rather than only by investigators who are simply
trying to do what they have been taught. One such reality is the wide acceptance of the myth that
a study with less than 80% power is fatally flawed. Another is that this misconception forces
investigators toward dishonesty by making them claim 80% power instead of disclosing the real
reasons for their chosen sample sizes. A prominent article concerning sample size, co-authored
by a leader of the CONSORT group (which sets standards for clinical trials), recently defended
obtaining a desired sample size via manipulation of assumptions as “an operational solution to a
real problem” (Schulz and Grimes, 2005, p. 1351). This suggests to us that facing these realities
is quite urgent.
We hope that these remarks will reduce concern about our methods, and we are pleased
that none of the discussants advocate an absolute requirement for 80% power in all
circumstances. We nevertheless fear that our proposal and the insights from the discussants will
have no impact on day to day practices concerning sample size. We therefore end by calling on
readers to stop enforcing a rigid 80% power requirement when they review proposals and to be
open to using—or at least tolerating—other methods, such as those we have proposed.
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